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GEOGRAPHICALLY SEXUAL?: ADVANCING LESBLAN
AND GAY INTERESTS THROUGH PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION
Darren Rosenblum*

Introduction
In the 1993 New Yoric City School Board elections, a system of
proportional representation1 allowed lesbians and gay men2 to elect representatives of their choice. In response to the School Board's plan to
introduce the Children of the Rainbow Curriculum? the New York City
chapter of the Christian Coalition, an organization of the Christian Right:
began an opposition campaign with the slogan "No Sodom on the Hudson'y5 that pitted parents of color against so-called "rich white gays.yy6
*Associate, Flemming, Zulack & Williamson, L.L.P., New York, N.Y.; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1991; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1995. This Article was
written with inspiration and encouragement from Professor Lani Guinier. Mary A. Inman
provided guidance in the intricacies of proportional representation and voting rights law.
Judith Reed served as my tutor in New York districting politics, as did Tom Duane, Robert
Bailey, Dick Dadey, Alan Gartner, and George Waffle. I would also like to thank Alys I.
Cohen, Scott B. Goldberg, Sarah Barringer Gordon, Jonathan Houlon, Marc Stein, Susan
Sturm, and my parents, Edward and Susan Rosenblum. I dedicate this Article to Darren
Kowitt, in admiration and love.
1 A "proportional representation" system is an electoral system that accords representation to groups of voters in proportion to their voting strength. Cf:LANI GUINIER,
RRANNY
OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESSIN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
214
n.73 (1994). In such a system, an elected official represents those individuals who actually
voted for her because her expressed views reflect their interests. Throughout this Article,
proportional representation is contrasted to districting, a geographically based electoral
system that currently predominates in the United States. See infra note 13. The form of
proportional representation used in the School Board elections was the single transferable
vote ("STY'), which is discussed at infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
2For the purposes of this Article, the terms "lesbians" and "gay men" include
individuals who are attracted, exclusively or not exclusively, to the same sex and who
identify, privately or publicly, with that attraction. Although lesbians and gay men
constitute two distinct groups with potentially different interests, they are considered
together in this Article unless otherwise specified.
The Rainbow Curriculum included history and social science lessons about racial,
ethnic, and sexual minorities. See Teaching About Gays and Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES,Sept.
27, 1992, 3 4, at 16.
In this Article, the term "Christian Right" encompasses a broad range of individuals
and organizations-notably the Christian Coalition-that support reactionary policies that
deprive women, lesbians, and gay men of their rights. See generally Glen Maxey, Running
Against the Right, in GAYAND LESBIANVICTORYFUND,OUT FOR OFFICE:CAMPAIGNING
I N THE GAYNINETIES159-63 (Kathleen DeBold ed., 1994) [hereinafter GAYAND LESBIAN
VICTORYFUND]; Gail Shibley, Coming Out on Every Doorstep, in GAY AND LESBIAN
VICTORYFUND91-97.
SSee N'Tanya Lee et al., Whose Kids? Our Kids! Race, Sexuality and the Right in
New York City's Curriculum Battles, 25 RADICALAM. 9, 17 (1991).
See id. at 11-12.
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Having succeeded in forcing the school chancellor's resignation, the Christian Coalition formulated a plan for the takeover of all New York City
school board^.^ The proportional system of the school board elections,
however, provided lesbian and gay communities8 with the opportunity to
use their activism to defeat the homophobia of the Christian Right. By
developing widely publicized endorsement slates based on questionnaires
sent to all of the candidates, lesbian and gay communities attracted support from a wide range of vote^-s.~ And on election day-which occurred
in the month following the highly successful 1993 Lesbian and Gay
March on Washingtonlo-lesbians and gay men went to the polls in an
unprecedented fashion." As a result, Jon Nalley, the leader of one lesbian
and gay-supported slate, garnered the most votes of any school board
candidate in the history of New York City, and the entire slate won.I2
As the overwhelming victory of lesbian and gay interests in the
school board elections demonstrates, a proportional representation system
can effectively serve the interests of communities that have otherwise
been unable to elect sufficient numbers of representatives. This Article
focuses specifically on lesbian and gay communities because these communities have been among the least successful in getting their interests
represented in the majority-rule districting system-the prevailing electoral system in the United States.I3 Although lesbian and gay communities
have increased their political power, few elected officials represent lesbian
and gay interests.I4 Furthermore, of the nearly half-million elected officials

See Sam Dillon, Lifring a Cor~servativeVoice; Christian Group Views School Board
Electiorls as a Test of Voter Support, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1993, $ 1, at 23 (discussing
political organizing by Christian activists for school board elections).
8 A "lesbian and gay community" comprises lesbians and gay men who share a
common culture and common political values. A lesbian and gay community may also be
geographically based.
See Interview with Richard Dadey, Executive Director of Empire State Pride Agenda,
in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 16, 1994); see also Telephone Interview with Jon Nalley, New
York City School Board Representative (Nov. 12, 1995).
l0See, e.g., Jeffrey Schmalz, March for Gay Rights; Gay Marchers Throng Mall in
Appeal for Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1993, at Al.
"For instance, in the lesbian and gay West Village-Chelsea district, voter turnout
quadrupled. See Sam Dillon, Light New York School Board Vote Was Really the Heaviest
Ever, N.Y. TIMES,May 19, 1993, at Al.
12See Sam Dillon, S~ipportersof Gay Rights Win More School Races, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1993, at B3.
I3A district is "[olne of the territorial areas into which an entire state or country,
county, municipality, or other political subdivision is divided, for . . electoral . . .
purposes!' BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
476 (6th ed. 1990). A single-member district exists
when a district is represented by one person. A multimember district exists when a district
elects a group of people to represent it. These concepts are detailed in part 11. The only
current alternative to districting is at-large voting, where "[ellected officials [are] chosen
by the voters of the State [or other political subdivision] as a whole rather than from
separate congressional or legislative districts." Id. at 125.
I4For a description of "lesbian and gay interests," see infra part I.A.

.

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 120 1996

19961

Lesbian and Gay Proportional Representation

121

in the United States, only seventy are openly lesbian or gay.15 This dearth
of representatives has occurred because in a district-based electoral system, only geographically defined lesbian and gay communities have the
opportunity to elect officials who represent their interests. Although many
lesbians and gay men choose to live in areas with large lesbian and gay
populations, sexual orientation has no natural correlation to geography.
This lack of a geographic correlation greatly decreases the ability of
districting schemes to represent a broad base of lesbian and gay interests.
Therefore, a districting system fails to ensure effective interest representation for lesbians and gay men.16 By contrast, a proportional representation system would greatly expand possibilities for lesbian and gay
interest representation.
Part I of this Article explores lesbian and gay interests and representational characteristics.17 Part I1 highlights the inadequacies of a
single-member districting system in representing the interests of lesbian
and gay communities. It concludes with an examination of the New York
City Council's 1991 redistricting, where the mobilization of strong lesbian
and gay communities in a receptive environment nonetheless failed to lead
to effective representation of lesbian and gay interests in the City Council.
Part 111 describes proportional representation systems and reveals how
such systems would better serve lesbian and gay communities. Part IV
acknowledges the political and legal obstacles to achieving proportional
representation. Finally, Part V asserts that both the increasing disenfranchisement of people of color from the electoral process and the high
degree of discontent with the system that has been expressed by the
general electorate in recent years might facilitate the conversion to a
proportional system. To promote a proportional representation system,
lesbian and gay communities must form coalitions with other minority
communities that remain underrepresented in a districting system. By
struggling with others to achieve interest representation, lesbians and gay
men will be engaged in the furtherance of a much broader goal of pro-

15 GAYAND LESBIAN
VICTORYFUND,supra note 4, at xiii.
16 "Interest representation" occurs when a representative advocates

for the interests of
a body of voters. Lani Guinier, No Tivo Seats: The Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA.L.
REV. 1413, 1462 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]. In contrast to interest
representation, "descriptive representation" occurs when a group is represented by one or
more members of that group. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights
Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1077, 1102 n.114 (1991)
[hereinafter Guinier, Tokenism]. For example, lesbian and gay interest representation
occurs when any elected official promotes a particular lesbian and gay interest; by contrast,
only lesbian and gay elected officials can descriptively represent lesbians and gay men.
'7For the purposes of this Article, the term "representational characteristics" means
the characteristics of members of a group that shape the group's interaction with the
electoral system.

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 121 1996

,

122

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

portional representation-namely,
mocracy.

[Vol. 31

the realization of a more complete de-

I. Lesbian and Gay Interests and Representational Characteristics
Despite the difficulty of defining lesbian and gay identity,18 lesbians
and gay men need to have their interests represented. After identifying the
interests of lesbians and gay men, this Part will examine certain characteristics of lesbians and gay men that affect their representation. The
purpose of this examination is to assess the ability of a single-member
districting system to achieve effective lesbian and gay interest representation.
A. Lesbian and Gay Interests and the Need for Effective Interest
Representation
Lesbian and gay interests arise from the wide array of legal issues
Anti-lesbian and gay violence vicfacing lesbian and gay cornm~nities.~~
timizes a shockingly high percentage of lesbians and gay men, wreaking
As localities debate how to
heavy damage individually and c~llectively.~~
promote Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome'("AIDS") awareness and
prevent the spread of the disease, Congress considers whether to curtail
government funding for AIDS research and medical careJ1 Schools and
child welfare agencies fail to meet the needs of lesbian and gay
and employment discrimination plagues lesbians and gay menJ3 States
use solicitation and sodomy statutes, which have been upheld by the
l8See, e.g.. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, in THELESBIANAND
GAYSTUDIESREADER45, 55 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993) (discussing the "incoherence of modern ways of conceptualizing same-sex desire and, hence, gay identity").
!F' or
an overview of the various forms of harassment and discrimination faced by
lesbians and gay men and of the inadequate protections provided by the legal system, see
L o s n r ~ ~GAY
s , MEN, AND THE LAW(William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (surveying cases,
statutes, legal theory, and relevant fiction); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation
attd the Law, 102 HARV.L. REV. 1508 (1989) (summarizing various legal areas as they
affect lesbians and gay men).
20See gerterally GARYD. COMSTOCK,
VIOLENCE
AGAINSTLESBIANS
AND GAYMEN
(1991).
2l Bennett Roth, AIDS Advocates Fear Brunt of Medicaid Cuts, HOUS.CHRON.,NOV.
4, 1995, at Al; The Bottoln Line is People are Dying, AIDS Funding is at Risk as Some
irt Cottgress Turtt Penny-wise and Pound Foolish, L.A. TIMES,July 21, 1995, at B8.
ZZSee, e.g., Donna Dennis & Ruth Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to Education, 4
GAYMENAND THE LAW,supra
YALEL. & POL'YREV.446 (1986), reprinted in LESBIANS,
note 19, at 156; Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farmworkers, Homeless andRunalvay
Youth: Challertging the Barriers to Inclusion, 13 LAW& INEQ.J. 99 (1994).
23See generally James Douglas, I Sit and Look Out: Employment Discrimination
Agaittst Hotnosexuals and the New Law of Unjust Dismissal, 33 WASH.U . J. URB. &
CONTE~IP.
L. 73 (1988); Gail Heatherly, Gay and Lesbian Rights: Employment Discriminatiott, 4 ANN.SURV.AM. L. 901 (1986).
D
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United States Supreme
to harass and intimidate lesbians and gay
men. Moreover, courts reinforce homophobia by excluding lesbians and
and child
gay men from family rights such as marriagesz5
custody." Lesbian and gay communities thus have a profound need for
representation at all levels of government-though few voting rights scholars
discuss lesbian and gay interests?*
In the face of anti-lesbian and gay discrimination, lesbians and gay
men have become more politically active. Local controversies such as
those concerning curricula in public schools and books in public libraries
help .build communities and coalitions that serve well for broader political
issues. Additionally, communities and coalitions have organized in opposition to state anti-lesbian and gay referenda.29 This political organizing
in localities and states across the country presages the kind of organization needed to represent lesbian and gay interests in the legislative, executive, and even judicial branches of state and federal government.
Electing advocates of lesbian and gay interests serves several purposes. First, achieving lesbian and gay interest representation might sway
lesbians and gay men to "keep the faitY30in the ability of the government
"Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's sodomy law).
25See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is not violated by a prohibition of
same-sex marriage); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review denied,
84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974) (holding that a prohibition of same-sex marriage did not
constitute sex discrimination). But see Baehr v. Lewin, 853 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding
that the prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the privacy and equal protection
guarantees of the Hawaiian constitution and that this prohibition constituted sex discrimination meriting strict scrutiny).
26Seegenerally Julia F. Davies, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional
Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEWENG.L. REV. 1055 (1995). But see 111
re Jacob, Nos. 195, 196, 1995 WL 643883 (N.Y. Nov. 2, 1995) (upholding the adoption
by a lesbian of her partner's child).
='See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio 1985) (denying a gay
father visiting rights until the children were old enough not to be influenced by his "errant
behavior"); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (reversing a lower court's
decision that granted custody of a child to his lesbian mother, awarding custody to the
child's grandmother).
28For some exceptions, see Mary A. Inman, C.P.R. (Change Through Proportional
Representation): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991,2005
(1993) and William H. Kysella, Jr., Gerrymandering Against Gays?, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY
249 (1994) (discussing representation of lesbians and gay men in California).
- 29Political organizing against such referenda has involved uniting and mobilizing
progressive, urban parts of states against rural areas that have generally supported the
referenda. The fight against Amendment 2, Colorado's anti-lesbian and gay referendum,
gained national attention with widespread boycotts and support for the legal team opposing
the amendment. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Colorado Faces Boycott Over Its Gay-Bias Vote,
N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1992, at A16. Oregon's anti-lesbian and gay referenda led to enormous
efforts in and out of the state to defeat the two measures. See, e.g., John Gallagher, Taking
the Initiative: Battles Over Gay Rights Intensify in Ohio, Colorado and Oregon, ADVOCATE, Oct. 5, 1993, at 24.
3OThis slogan of Harlem's U.S. Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., applies well
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to respond to the needs of subjugated minorities. Second, the purpose of
lesbian and gay interest representation is not merely to change the law,
but, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, to "expand and affect
Since lesbians and gay men constitute a minority of
political debate.7731
the population, even increased representation may not lead to the full
realization of their interests. Nonetheless, visibility, awareness, and progress should follow from broader discussion of lesbian and gay interests.

B. The Representational Characteristics of Lesbians and Gay Men
Three characteristics of lesbians and gay men affect the representation
of their interests: lesbians and gay men are officially unidentifiable, they
have intersectional identities, and they are often geographically dispersed."
First, because lesbians and gay men can choose whether to identify publicly and politically with their sexual orientation, they constitute an "officially
3 ~ districting purposes, simplistic notions of identity
unidentifiable" g r o ~ p .For
are used to locate racial minorities. Racial identity, for all its complexity,
is officially quite fixed. In contrast, lesbians and gay men are able to pass
as heterosexual, thus rendering the location of lesbian and gay communities difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, districts are drawn from census
data, which do not include information on sexual 0rientation.3~Alternative
methods, such as through records of contributors to lesbian and gay
organizations and the mapping of lesbian and gay businesses and institutions, also fail to identify accurately the location and size of lesbian and
gay communitie~.~~

to the tenuous relationship between lesbian and gay voters and the government. See Lani
Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 393, 435 n.7 (1989).
3' Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 202 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoted irz Lani Guinier, The Represerztation of Minority Interests: The Question of
Sitigle-Mernber Districts, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1135, 1146 (1993) [hereinafter Guinier,
Sirtgle-Member Districts].
32Barbara A. Weightman, Conznzentary: Towards a Geography of the Gay Community,
1 J. CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY
106, 107 (1981) ("The at-large gay community is not a
community in the traditional sociological sense in that it lacks a broad definable territorial
base with primary institutions serving a residential population."); see also Kysella, supra
note 28, at 265.
33The term "officially unidentifiable" is used to indicate that political systems are
unable to determine who is lesbian or gay.
s4Although same-sex households, which the census does quantify, might indicate
some lesbian and gay population, such statistics are overinclusive to the extent that they
include college fraternities, sororities, and the many heterosexual men and women who
live together. Similarly, many lesbians and gay men live with members of the opposite sex
and would thus be undercounted if same-sex households were the only measures used to
quantify lesbian and gay communities.
a5See irlfra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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The continuum of sexuality is another complicating factor that contributes to the unidentifiability of lesbians and gay men. Sexual identity
and interests are fluid within individuals and over
The fact that
general lesbian and gay population estimates vary greatly demonstrates
the difficulty of locating and quantifying lesbian and gay communities.
The second representational characteristic of lesbians and gay men is
that they have intersectional identities.37 Lesbians and gay men comprise
many racial, ethnic, class, and gender groups and, therefore, face multiple
di~criminations.3~
Respecting the unique ways in which women, racial
minorities, poor people, and other disadvantaged and marginalized groups
face anti-lesbian and gay discrimination requires consideration of their
different interests as part of the overall need for lesbian and gay interest
repre~entation.~~
The third characteristic of lesbians and gay men is related to intersectionality: lesbians and gay men are geographically dispersed. Although
some lesbians and gay men live in identifiable urban "ghettos,"40 many
live in neighborhoods correlated with their class, race, or ethnicity rather
36The 10% figure cited in Alfred Kinsey's landmark studies of human sexuality serves
as a common reference point for quantifying lesbian and gay communities, even for
representation purposes. See ALFREDC. KINSEYET AL., SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN
IN THE HUMANMALE
FEMALE(1953); ALFREDC. KINSEYET AL., SEXUALBEHAVIOR
(1948);see also, The Case of the Missing Districts, OUTWEEK,
May 1, 1991,at 4 ("[Llesbians
and gays, with at least 10% of the city's population, deserve at least five [of 51 seats on
the City Council]."). But see Felicity Barringer, Sex Survey of American Men Finds 1%
Are Gay, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 15, 1993, at Al; Stuart Elliott, A Sharper View of Gay
Consumers, N.Y. TIMES,June 9, 1994,at Dl.
37The meaning of the term "intersectional" here follows that used by Professor
Kimberlk Crenshaw, which refers to a person's multiple, oppressed identities. For example,
African American women are oppressed as African Americans and as women, and have
multiple identities as a result of the oppression that the two groups face. Crenshaw argues
that this multiple discrimination is both heavier than and distinct from the sum of its parts.
See generally Kimberlk Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U . CHI. LEGALF. 139 (1989). For a closer examination of intersectionality
in lesbian and gay communities, see Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the
Failure of Lesbian and Gay Victories, 4 LAW& SEXUALITY
83 (1994).
38The use of the plural "genders" indicates the multiplicity of genders that exist and
acknowledges the important role of transgendered individuals in the lesbian dnd gay
movement. For a powerful account of life at the borders of gender, see KATEBORNSTEIN,
GENDEROUTLAW(1994).
39As a participant in Gay and Lesbian Youth of New York from 1984 to 1986, I
observed the differing needs of white, African American, and Latino lesbian and gay youth.
The white teenagers more often had their own rooms in their homes and thus greater
privacy. In addition, they were better able to afford the cafes and restaurants to which the
group retreated after meetings. The teenagers of color, by contrast, often had no private
space and less disposable money. As a result, the teenagers of color "hung out" more in
the street and thus may have faced more police and other homophobic harassment. These
different perspectives could also affect political decisions. For example, although harsher
policing of the streets would not seem to be a problematic issue for white lesbians and
gay men, it would negatively affect lesbians and gay men of color.
40Many refer to lesbian and gay urban communities as "ghettos." See, e.g., MANUEL
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than their sexual orientation-either by choice or economic n e ~ e s s i t y . ~ ~
Lesbians are particularly dispersed in that they "tend not to concentrate
in a given territory, but establish social and interpersonal networks."42 In
addition, the increasing tendency among lesbians and gay men to move
to the suburbs, which reflects the movement of the population as a whole,
contributes to geographic dispersionP3
11. Subjugation of Lesbian and Gay Interest Representation Through

Districting
Districting relies on two premises that render it an ineffective system
of representation for lesbians and gay men-even in the absence of homophobic motivation on the part of district line drawers. First, for districting to ensure the representation of a community's interests, line drawers must be able to identify the community. Because lesbians and gay men
are officially unidentifiable, representing their interests through a districting scheme would prove to be a challenge even for the most supportive
of line drawers. Second, the community must be compact enough to fall
into one district. Therefore, to the extent that lesbians and gay men are
dispersed, a districting system cannot effectively or accurately represent
lesbian and gay interests.
This Part addresses the barriers to achieving effective lesbian and gay
interest representation in a districting system. First, it outlines districting
guidelines and reveals how, despite such guidelines, all districting actually
constitutes gerrymandering. Second, it analyzes the possible outcomes for
lesbian and gay interest representation in a districting system. Third, it
demonstrates that: under each of these outcomes, problems exist that limit
the potential for effective lesbian and gay interest representation. Fourth,
it shows that even where effective lesbian and gay interest representation
CASTELLS,
THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL
THEORYOF URBAN
SOCIALMOVEMENTS
137 (1982) (describing gay migration to coastal cities).
41 There is some indication that lesbians and gay men of color more frequently remain
in their families' neighborhoods instead of moving to predominantly lesbian or gay
neighborhoods that are often white. Randy Kennedy, Christopher Street: Changes Sweep
the Gay Mecca, N.Y. TIMES,June 19, 1994, 8 14, at 6.
42 See CASTELLS,
supra note 40, at 140. ("On the whole they are poorer than gay men
and have less choice in terms of work and location, and their politics is less directed
towards the established political system.") (citations omitted). But see Sy Adler &Johanna
Brenner, Gender and Space: Lesbians and Gay Men in the City, 16 INT'LJ. URB. &
REGIONAL
RES. 24 (1992) (arguing that lesbians are more spatially concentrated than the
general literature suggests).
43See Jane Gross, A Milestone in the Fight for Gay Rights: A Quiet Suburban Life,
N.Y.Trhres, June 30, 1991, § 4, at 16. Further, suburban lesbians and gay men, because
they lead a different lifestyle from their urban counterparts, may have different representational needs. Cf. Frederick R. Lynch, Nonghetto Gays: An Ethnography of Suburban
Honrosexuals, in GAYCULTURE
IN AMERICA
165 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1992).
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is prevented by districting, lesbian and gay communities are unable to
obtain Voting Rights Act remedies. Finally, it describes the 1991 redistricting for the New York City Council, which exemplifies the inadequacy
of districting systems in representing lesbian and gay interests.
A. Districting Requirements
The act of districting is subject to constitutional and statutory guidelines. First, stemming from several 1964 Supreme Court cases44and their
population equality standards require.strict equality of population among all districts in a jurisdiction. A second requirement is that
apportionment not "minimize or eliminate7' the power of a political
The third criterion in apportionment-the prevention of racial discrimination-is the most contentious and has potentially the greatest impact on lesbian and gay interest representation because in urban spaces,
racial, ethnic, and lesbian and gay communities often share a small geographic area.47The Voting Rights Act of 1965, its 1982 amendments, and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions prohibit districting that is designed
to weaken racial group voting potential.48The Voting Rights Act thereby
increased the likelihood that racial minorities would elect representatives
of their choice.49Section 2 of the Act permits racial and language minorities to challenge districting plans that dilute their voting power, which
44SeeLucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (overturning Colorado's
state legislative apportionment plans because they were not sufficiently grounded on
population); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause requires that both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on
a population basis); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring congressional
districts to represent equal numbers of people).
4s See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding that there are no de minimis
standards below which deviation from complete equality is constitutional); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1972) (upholding a Virginia state legislature apportionment plan
with an average variance of 3.89%); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding
that respecting political subdivisions cannot derail the strict requirement of a good faith
effort to achieve mathematically precise equality).
46 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (holding a Connecticut apportionment
that attempted to reflect the state's balance of party affiliation to be constitutional); see
also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that political gerrymandering
violates the Equal Protection Clause and that a threshold showing of discriminatory vote
dilution is required for a prima facie claim).
471n recent years, the Supreme Court has transformed the role that race may legitimately play in the districting process. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). For more discussion of the impact of this change,
see infra part 1V.A.
48See White v. Register, 412 U.S. 757 (1993) (striking down multimember Texas
House districts for diluting black and Hispanic votes); Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1985) (rejecting the use of multimember districts in North Carolina's legislative
reapportionment for undermining the effectiveness of black votes).
49S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 182.
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occurs when a plan reduces or excludes a minority's voice in the political
pr0cess.5~Section 5 is intended to protect minority voting rights in a
jurisdiction that is specifically required to preclear its districting plans
with the United States Justice Department.sl The Voting Rights Act, however, does not require the creation of majority districts based on race or
ethni~ity.5~
Ideally, these criteria would be used to guide redistricting. In practice, however, districting is not an objective process. As recognized by the
Supreme Court in GafSney v. Cummings, "[dlistrict lines are rarely neutral
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly
Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely
The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have
substantial political consequence^."^^ In practice, districting must be performed by a group-either a legislature or an entity appointed by a
legislature-that is necessarily minuscule relative to the population being
divided. Any such group can attempt to engineer electoral politics by
dividing the population into favorably constructed electorates. When the
majority group has the power to draw distinct lines without any protections for minority groups, the majority can institutionalize its dominance.
Such a representational system in a pervasively homophobic society directly impedes lesbian and gay interest representation.

....

B. Possible Outcomes for Lesbian and Gay Interest Representation in
a Districting System
The Voting Rights Act permits lesbian and gay interest representation
only when the creation of a lesbian and gay district would not interfere
with the drawing of a majority-minority
Since the most visible
and heretofore represented lesbian and gay communities have largely been
located in urban areas, the three outcomes described in this Section presume an urban context. The first two possible outcomes for lesbian and
gay interest representation under the Voting Rights Act involve a lesbian
and gay community that is located entirely within one district, while the
third involves a community split by two or more districts.
Sovoting Rights Act of 1965 5 2, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (1988).
Rights Act of 1965 5 5, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973c (1988).
52See John R. Dunne, Remarks: Redistricting in the 1990s: The New York Example,
L. REV.1127, 1128-29 (1993).
14 CARDOZO
53412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
54"Majority-minority" indicates a majority of racial, ethnic, or language minorities.
See SUBMISSION
UNDERSECTION
5 OF THE VOTINGRIGHTSACTFOR PRECLEARANCE
OF
THE 1991 REDISTRICTING
PLANFOR NEWYORKCITYCOUNCIL
(June 17, 1989) (on file
with the New York Municipal Library) [hereinafter SUBMISSION].
The SUBMISSION
did not
include sexual minorities in this group.
51 Voting
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The first possible outcome is the creation of a majority-lesbian and
. ~ ~ outcome occurs primarily in predominantly white disgay d i s t r i ~ tThis
tricts when several adjacent majority-minority districts have left a concentrated white lesbian and gay community. Given that facilitating minority representation is the fundamental goal of the Voting Rights Act, cities
tend to draw majority-minority districts first, thus subordinating the creation of lesbian and gay districts to Voting Rights Act requirement^.^^
A lesbian and gay community that is too small to form an entire
single-member district might completely fall withhi the bandaries of a
district. This second possible outcome, a lesbian and gay "influence district," could exist in a white, multicultural, or majority-minority
Such a district would permit voters in a lesbian and gay community to
sway elections and would provide them with ample attention from candidates. One could well imagine a candidate who represented lesbian and
gay interests succeeding in such a progressive district-although such a
candidate necessarily would have to appeal to voters outside of the lesbian
and gay community.
An influential lesbian and gay community is only possible, however,
where the majority is not hostile to lesbian and gay interests. In a district
where anti-lesbian and gay sentiment divided the population, candidates
representing lesbian and gay interests could be consistently defeatedeven if forty-nine percent of the district were lesbian and gay. In such a
district, a lesbian and gay community could lose any influence that its
size might otherwise afford it.
Although lesbian and gay majority and influence districts provide the
best opportunity for lesbian and gay interest representation in a districting
system, the third outcome-in which a lesbian and gay community is
"New York City Council District 3 is such a district. ~ e t w e e nthe West Harlem and
Chinatown districts is an area that is approximately 75% white-more than 30 percentage
points above the city average. Community pressure in this area led to the creation of a
majority-lesbian and gay district. See Felicia R. Lee, Plan for New City Council Passes
in Praise and Anger, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1991, at B1 [hereinafter Plan Passes]. It is less
likely that a majority-minority district would be formed with a majority of lesbians and
gay men of color, because well-known lesbian and gay "ghettos" are generally located in
white neighborhoods. The statistics used to advocate for a lesbian and gay district, which
are based on donor lists to lesbian and gay organizations, probably do not reflect the size
of lesbian and gay communities of color because those communities may not participate
as frequently in donor programs. See Testimony by Richard Dadey, Executive Director of
Empire State Pride Agenda, before the New York City Districting Commission (Mar. 27.
1991) (on file with author).
s6See Interview with Judith Reed, General Counsel for the 1991 New York City
Districting Commission, in New York, N.Y. @ec. 27, 1993).
57Robert Bailey argues that New York City Council District 25 (Jackson Heights,
Queens) is an example of such a district. "All the Black, Latino (mostly Colombian), and
gay communities agreed on a middle class majority-minority district with a white liberal
minority." Interview with Robert Bailey, Consultant to the New York City Districting
Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 30, 1993).

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129 1996

130

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 31

"fractured" between districts-frustrates the opportunity for a lesbian and
gay community to elect an official who is responsive to the interests of
its members. In this situation, members of a community that might be
large enough to qualify as a majority in a hypothetical district, but that
lacks the political power necessary to sway the process, would be unable
to combine their votes for the representative of their choice because they
would be split among two or more districts.58
C. Districting Problems that Limit the Potential for Effective Lesbian
and Gay Interest Representation
Achieving some degree of lesbian and gay interest representation
through a majority district or an influence district may be a worthy goal.
Indeed, in the context of a seemingly unchangeable representational system, it may be essential in empowering lesbian and gay communities.
Even when lesbian and gay interest representation is possible, however,
its effectiveness is dampened by the problems of "virtual representation,"
"hierarchization of communities," and "tokenism."

I . Virtual Representation
First among these representational problems is "virtual representation,"
a situation in which an individual's interests are theoretically represented
by officials elected by other districts.59In contrast, "direct representation"
assumes that an individual is represented only by those elected representatives for whom the individual voted.60Professor Lani Guinier has
observed that virtual representation is founded on the following misconceptions: indirect representation; representation of similar interests elseEach of these three assumptions
where; and top-down repre~entation.~~
misleads people into accepting the value of districting. Under the indirect
representation assumption, for example, New York City Council District
3, which was created as a lesbian and gay district, indirectly represents
lesbian and gay voters city-wide outside of that district. The "gay district"
58 For example, fracturing occurred when Park Slope and neighboring areas in Brooklyn, collectively constituting the most concentrated lesbian and gay community in New
York City, were split among adjacent majority-minority districts that had been drawn to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act's requirement that racial minorities be protected. Interview
with Robert Bailey, supra note 57.
59See Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case
of the Ettiperor's Clothes, 71 TEX.L. REV. 1589, 1607 n.79 (1993) [hereinafter Guinier,
Etttperor's Clorhes]; see also JOHNP. REID,THE CONCEPT
OF REPRESENTATION
IN THE
AGEOF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
50 (1989) (stating that the English claimed that the
American colonies were represented in Parliament by virtual representation).
60Guinier,Ettiperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1612.
61 Id. at 1607.
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representative thus becomes the politician upon whom all lesbian and gay
voters in the city depend.
The second assumption is that while lesbian and gay communities
outside of the lesbian and gay district may not have direct representation,
their interests are represented to the extent that they coincide with the
interests of those directly represented elsewhere within the jurisdiction.
Their votes are, therefore, not wasted, even though they were cast for the
losing party in their district. The notion, however, that one representative
can serve different, voiceless lesbian and gay c o m ~ o i t j e sin a jurisdiction ignores potentially profound distinctions among communitie~.~~
The third assumption of viaual representation, topdown representation,
leads to the conclusion that the lesbian and gay voters who opposed a
homophobic representative are nonetheless represented by her because
they live within her district. However, it is unlikely that a representative
would vote based on the interests of those who opposed her. Top-down
representation would prove particularly frustrating for a district influence
group, which would see its community shut out of the political process
despite its considerable size.

2. Hierarchization in Communities
Virtual representation, which excludes individual communities from
the opportunity to elect their representatives of choice, creates a hierarchy
between those communities that can choose representation and those for
whom representation is chosen--even though the communities may share
similar interests. The lesbian and gay communities that reside within
lesbian and gay majority or influence districts attain greater prominence
through their representation. By contrast, lesbians and gay men of color
who choose to live in neighborhoods that reflect their racial or ethnic
identity might forfeit direct representation of their lesbian or gay identity
when their jurisdiction's only lesbian or gay district is majority-white. If
the sole representative of lesbian and gay interests comes from a predominantly white district, lesbian and gay interests tend to be constructed
around this whiteness.
The resulting hierarchy among lesbian and gay communities raises
similar theoretical problems to those that confront race-based districting,
including essentialism, isolation, and division.63 Essentialist notions of
identity, in which a set of characteristics is assumed to apply to all
members of that group, are encouraged by the districting process. Districting accords directly represented lesbians and gay men an essentialist
62Zd. at 1608.
63See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.L. REV.588, 634-39 (1993).
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identity, whereby their characteristics and needs are imputed to all other
lesbians and gay men.
San Francisco Supervisor Harry Britt's statement that "[wlhen gays
are spatially scattered, they are not gay, because they are in~isible,"~"
demonstrates the isolating effects of districting. Under a districting system, location means identity, and those lesbians and gay men either
uninterested or unable to live in a represented area are, for political
purposes, not gay. For example, if lesbians in Park Slope, Brooklyn,
disagreed with gay men in the West Village, their disagreement would
have little impact on the City Council; the "lesbian and gay" position
would be that of the largely white and male West Village-Chelsea district.
Similarly, the fact that lesbian and gay direct representation in California
comes from San Francisco and West Hollywood transforms these communities into the lesbian and gay voice of the state.65 As the directly represented community is both privileged with respect to and isolated from
other local lesbian and gay communities, districting divides the interests
of virtually represented communities from those that are directly represented.

3. Tokenism
"Tokenism" refers to the marginalization of a minority group's single
representative within a majority space.66Tokenism assumes that all of the
lesbian and gay communities in a jurisdiction can be represented adequately by a single representative. Although that one representative might
provide effective representation in some respects, her abilities would be
limited as the only direct representative of lesbian and gay interests in the
jurisdiction. Therefore, tokenism can be construed as an attempt to silence
calls for fuller representation of lesbian and gay interest^.^^

D. Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from Remedies for Vote
Dilution
The previous Section described the problems that occur when lesbian
and gay communities achieve some interest representation through districting. This Section shows that where lesbian and gay communities are
unable to attain any interest representation at all-a situation that may
occur where a community is fractured or even in an influence district64 CASTELLS,
supra

note 40, at 138.
65Qe Kysella, supra note 28, at 265-67.
66Guinier, Tokerlism, supra note 16, at 1116.
67See, e.g., The Case of tlze Missing Districts, OUTWEEK,
May 1, 1991,at 4 (deriding
the lesbian and gay district in the New York City Districting Commission's proposed
redistricting plan as "an afterthought, a bone to throw to our community").
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they are unlikely to achieve redress through either statutory or constitutional means.
The Voting Rights Act does not recognize lesbians and gay men as a
protected group, nor does any other judicial remedy apply specifically to
lesbian and gay "vote dilution."68 According to the definitive Supreme
Court case on vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act, Thornburg v.
G i n g l e ~ the
, ~ ~central remedy for dilution is the creation of majorityminority single-member distri~ts.7~
To satisfy the three prongs of the
Gingles test, a minority group must demonstrate that it is both geographically concentrated and sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority of a
single-member district, that it is politically cohesive, and that its electoral
success is being impeded by majority bloc v0ting.7~A minority group
must therefore be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a hypothetical single-member distri~t.7~
It would be difficult for lesbian and gay communities to meet the first
prong of the Gingles test because of the geographic dispersion of lesbian
and gay voters and because of their intersectional identities. This prong
is more easily met by African American communities, which face far
greater housing segregation-and thus geographic concentration-than do
lesbians and gay me11.7~ Although some lesbians and gay men rightfully
claim that social and even housing discrimination leads them to live in
predominantly lesbian and gay neighborh0ods,7~this "ghettoization" does
not generally provide sufficient geographic concentration for a section 2
claim.
The second prong of the Gingles test is that the minority group must
Such cohesiveness is demonstrated by a high
be politically cohe~ive.~S

68Vote dilution has been defined as "a process whereby election laws or practices,
either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable
group to diminish the voting strength of at least another group." Chandler Davidson,
Introduction, in MINORITYVOTEDILUTION4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
69478 U.S. 30 (1986).
70Zd. at 45-51.
71Zd. at 48-51. It should be noted that the existence of the three Gingles factors is
necessary, but not sufficient, proof of a section 2 violation under the Voting Rights Act.
See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994). See generally BERNARD
GROFMAN
ET AL., MINORITYREPRESENTATION AND THE QUESTFOR VOTINGEQUALITY
61-81 (1992) (tracing vote dilution standard after Gingles). However, this Article argues
that lesbians and gay men cannot meet the burden of proof even for the threshold Gingles
factors. More recent Supreme Court reformulation of vote dilution analysis is thus not
particularly relevant here.
72See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
73The "extreme spacial segregation" of African Americans lends some validity to the
use of geography for the purpose of ensuring adequate group representation. See Lani
Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV.L. REV. 109, 127
n.119 (1994).
74 Cf.CASTELLS,
supra note 40, at 138-39.
75See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-73.
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"correlation between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of certain
candidate^."^^ Lesbians and gay men might indeed vote alike on certain
issues. Proving political cohesiveness, however, would require evidence
that is unavailable for lesbians and gay men because they are officially
unidentifiable. Furthermore, despite certain common lesbian and gay interests, the views of lesbians and gay men span the political spectrum.77
The third and final prong of the Gingles test requires that the minority
group's preferred candidate be defeated by majority bloc voting.78 The
fact that lesbians and gay men, as well as heterosexual candidates supporting lesbian and gay interests, have been elected would make it difficult
to prove that heterosexual bloc voting has excluded the "preferred candidates" of lesbians and gay men from public office.
Dilution might also be proven through fracturing and packing?9 When
minority voters are packed into a district beyond the numbers needed to
assure a majority, their jurisdiction-wide influence is weakened. Conversely, when those votes are spread among districts at levels lower than
those needed for a majority, they are unable to elect a representative, and
their influence in the governing process is fractured.80Remedies exist for
packing and fracturing, but they generally require "hard data," such as
census data, that are largely available only for racial and ethnic minority
c ~ m m u n i t i e sFinding
.~~
incontrovertible proof of lesbian and gay fracturing, by contrast, would be impossible because there is no possible baseline calculation of the voting potential of lesbians and gay men.
One writer has argued that, instead of bringing a claim under the
Voting Rights Act, lesbians and gay men can challenge vote dilution under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.82Even if such
an argument were successful, however, the representational characteristics
d at. 53.
77The existence of gay Republican clubs as well as radical groups such as ACT-UP
reflects the political diversity of lesbians and gay men. See generally FRANKBROWNING,
OF DESIRE(1993) (exploring the complex politics of gay male communiTHE CULTURE
ties).
78 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51 ("Flhe minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate's running unopposed-usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate.").
79See GROFMAN,
supra note 71, at 114.
sosee Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1615; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1075-76 (2d ed. 1988).
81Even where such numbers are lacking, name identification programs may help
clarify the location of particular ethnic groups. See Peter Momsson, Using the Surname
Method to Gauge Hispanic and Asian Voting Strength in Proposed Council Districts, Ex.
12 of Exhibits Book 1 of SUBMISSION
UNDER SECTION
5 OF THE VOTINGRIGHTSACT FOR
PRECLEARANCE
OF TIIE 1991 REDISTRICTING
PLANFOR NEW YORKCITYCOUNCIL6 (Feb.
20, 1991) (on file with the New York Municipal Library).
8ZSee Kysella, supra note 28, at 262-74 (arguing that lesbian and gay communities
in urban California could prevail under an equal protection cause of action).
76 ~
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of lesbians and gay men pose a remedial problem in any districting
system. Therefore, an equal protection remedy-so long as it is districtbased--does nothing to resolve the problems of virtual representation,
hierarchization, and tokenism. Further, the lack of any census data dooms
a lesbian or gay plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination in districting
procedures. In any case, until the United States Supreme Court clarifies
the constitutional status of lesbians and gay men, the ultimate success of
any equal protection challenge to districting is highly q~estionable.~~
In sum, it is unlikely that challenges under either the 'doting Rights
Act or the Equal Protection Clause will succeed in remedying the inadequate representation of lesbian and gay interests under our current districting system.
E. Redistricting the New York City Council
The gay and lesbian community, long a contributor to the life
and spirit which is uniquely New York's, deserves a seat at the
table.84

Recent events in New York City provide an excellent example of
districting's inadequacies with respect to lesbian and gay interest representation. In Board of Estimate v. Morris,ss the United States Supreme
Court declared a portion of New York City's government unconstitutional.
The Court held that allowing all of the boroughs to have the same number
of representatives despite their vast disparities in population violated the
.~~
this unconconstitutional mandate of one-person, o n e - v ~ t eRemedying
stitutionality led to radical structural change that expanded the power and
size of the City Council while spurring a complex interaction of interest
In 1991, the combination of
group politics and mandated req~irements.~~
S3TheSupreme Court may make its position on the constitutional rights of lesbians
and gay men more explicit this Term in its decision regarding Colorado's Amendment 2.
See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (striking down a Colorado constitutional
amendment providing that lesbian or gay conduct, orientation, or practices could not
provide the basis for protected class status), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
S4Evelyn Hernandez, Gays Launch Drive for Council, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Apr. 7, 1991,
at 7 (auoting Richard Dadev, Executive Director of Empire State Pride Agenda).
G289 ~ . s688
. (1989):s6Zd.; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Frank J. Macchiarola &
Joseph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districtinn Commission: Renewed Opportunity
for iarticipation in Local Government o; ace- as& Gerrymandering?, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1175, 1181 (1993).
See Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bulhvinkles: The Limitations of
Single-Member Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 759, 764 (1993).
The New York City Charter Revision Commission considered several reforms to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of Board of Estimate v. Morris. It considered bicameral
legislatures. Id. It also contemplated adopting weighted voting and even proportional
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the New York City Districting Commission's ("Com~nission'~)
relatively open
decision-making process, the Commission's independence from the City
Council, and strong advocacy by lesbian and gay communities before the
Commission created perhaps the best possible opportunity for lesbians and
gay men to obtain effective interest representation through districting. While
the Commission subsequently did create one majority-lesbian and gay
district, the constraints of a districting system nonetheless left the interests of New York's lesbian and gay communities largely unrepresented.
The Commission's effort to empower minorities and reverse New
York's decades-old record of weak minority representation was bolstered
by the 1990 census.88That census revealed that New York City had become
majority-minority, with 56.3% of its population identifying as African
American, Latino, or Asian American. Although Judith Reed has noted
that "[tlhe work of the Commission was favorably affected by the presence of so many members of racial and language minority groups protected by the Voting Rights Act,"89 it was still a small body that made
fundamental decisions for the entire city's representation.gO
The Commission conducted as open a process as could be imagined
for a group appointed to draw the lines that would determine the representation of the entire population of the city. It held public hearings in all
neighborhoods of the city, provided public access to its computer districting program,gl and reviewed over thirty alternate plans submitted by community groups and other concerned parties.g2 Furthermore, the Commission delineated districts primarily by focusing on concentrations of racial
and language minorities. Once districts were drawn around these areas,
white districts filled in the remainder of the map?3
As part of the criteria for redistricting, the New York City Charter
left open the possibility of representing the interests of lesbian and gay
communities. "District lines," it read, "shall keep intact neighborhoods
and communities with established ties of common interest and associaThe
tion, whether historical, racial, economic, ethnic, religious or other.7794
representation. See Interview with Judith Reed, supra note 56. The Commission ultimately
supported overhauling the City Council. SUBMISSION,
supra note 54.
assee Interview with Judith Reed, supra note 56; see also ALANGARTNER,
DRAWING
THE LINES:REDISTRICTING
AND THE POLITICS
OF RACIAL
SUCCESSION
IN NEWYORK55-56
n.72 (1993).
89Affidavit of Judith Reed at 1, Ravitch v. City of N.Y., No. 90 Civ. 5752 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 1992).
gOThe Commission comprised four African Americans, three Latinos, one Asian
American, and seven whites. Id.
91See GARTNER,
supra note 88, at 135.
92SeeInterview with Judith Reed, supra note 56.
93See id. This action was taken prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding that a Georgia district drawn predominantly to
empower African Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause).
9
4
C OF THE
~ CITY
~ OF
~ NEW
~ YORK
~ 5~52(l)(c) (as amended Dec. 31, 1989).

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 136 1996

19961

Lesbian and Gay Proportional Representation

137

, ~ ~ giving
term "other" was a subtle reference to sexual o r i e n t a t i ~ nthus
consideration of lesbian and gay interest representation precedence in line
drawing over such traditional but not constitutionally mandated considerations
as compactnessg6and respect for neighborhood and borough bo~ndaries.9~
Lesbian and gay activists hoped to take advantage of the Charter's
potentially inclusive language. The Empire State Pride Agenda ("ESPA"),
the most prominent state-wide lesbian and gay political organization,
worked to create a lesbian and gay district in the West Village-Chelsea
.~~
from primaries and deetisns that ineluded
area of M a n h ~ t t a nRetmrrs
openly gay candidates formed the principal evidence for the creation of
a West Village-Chelsea district by demonstrating the existence of an identifiable population of supporter^.^^ Maps showing the locations of institutions such as bookstores, bars, and community organizations suggested
the density of the lesbian and gay population.loOAn analysis of a 34,000person mailing list of contributors to lesbian and gay institutions organized by zip code suggested that the concentration of lesbian and gay
donors was five times higher in Chelsea and the West Village than in the
rest of Manhattan.lol Manhattan activists could thus draw a geographically
compact line around this concentration of lesbians and gay men.
The creation of a gay and lesbian district in Manhattan thus required
creative contortionism, as an amorphous lesbian and gay community was
squeezed into district lines. This piecemeal pragmatism of alternate mapping illustrates a districting system's inherent inability to satisfy lesbian
and gay electoral needs.
Ultimately, the Commission responded favorably by creating a lesbian and gay district in Manhattan.lo2The Commission was unable to
-

-

-

-

-

g5See Hernandez, supra note 84. Both Robert Bailey, a consultant to the Commission,
and Alan Gartner, the executive director of the Commission, confirmed this implication of
the term. See Interview with Robert Bailey, supra note 57; GARTNER,
supra note 88, at
167. But cf: Frank Lynn, Seeking More Minority Council Members, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 24,
1991, 9 1, at 32 (asserting that Republicans used the term "other" to base a claim to
representation on the Council).
g6A district is compact when its borders are as close as possible to a central point so
that the shape is easily identifiable. Gerrymandering is often viewed as the opposite of
compactness because gerrymandered districts often have bizarre shapes. See Dillard v.
Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1460 (h4.D. Ala. 1988) (explaining the
reasons for the emphasis on compactness).
g7See CHARTEROF THE CITY OF NEW YORK§ 52(l)(d)-(g) (as amended Dec. 31,
1989).
g8See Lynn, supra note 95.
991d.; see GARTNER,
supra note 88, at 133.
'OOGARTNER,supra note 88, at 133. Accepting lesbian and gay institutions as an
unmediated proxy for locating lesbian and gay communities, however, dissewes lesbians
and gay men who use these institutions without residing near them.
lolId.; testimony by Richard Dadey, supra note 55 (presenting data gathered by the
media group Stmb-Dawson).
1021nitially,the district divided the community at Christopher Street. However, by
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create a majority-minority district in the West Village-Chelsea area because of the relatively low percentage of African Americans and Latinos.
It could therefore take "other" factors into consideration and fashion a
district organized around sexual orientation.
The ability of Manhattan lesbian and gay advocates to develop a
working relationship with other minority communities contributed greatly
to the creation of a lesbian and gay district.lo3Lesbian and gay advocates
met with leaders of other minority communities to assuage any fears that
a lesbian and gay district would be created at the expense of an ethnic or
racial minority district.lo4In particular, an alliance between lesbian and
gay advocates and Asian American leaders ensured that district lines
would be drawn in a way that empowered both communities.105
The West Village-Chelsea community is perhaps the most powerful
lesbian and gay community in New York City.lo6It now provides the sole
direct representation for lesbian and gay New Yorkers in the City Council
and New York State Legislature, and it elects what many consider to be
the most progressive seat in the'united States House of Representatives.lo7
Through a series of primary votes and the election of New York's first
openly lesbian state representative, the lesbian and gay community in this
area established itself as an organized, well-financed political constituency.los
Even though Manhattan advocates received a district resembling their
goal, the process by which that district was achieved demonstrates the
difficulties faced by lesbians and gay men in the circuitous, hierarchical
districting process. Similar problems were faced by residents of Brooklyn,
who had a far more difficult time convincing the Commission to create a
lesbian and gay district. Brooklyn advocates supported a district centered
in Park Slope, the heart of Brooklyn's lesbian and gay community.109
shifting boundaries increasingly southward, the Commission ultimately included the entire
identifiable West Village-Chelsea lesbian and gay community.
lo3See GARTNER,
supra note 88, at 132.
'"See Interview with Alan Gartner, Executive Director of New York City Districting
Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 6, 1994).
losSec Richard Dadey, Address to the Districting Commission (Mar. 27, 1991) (on file
with author). An alliance between gay and lesbian advocates and the Asian American
community headed off a last-minute clash with the supporters of the multiethnic Chinasupra note 88, at 134. But cf: Yoko Yoshikawa, The Heat is On
town proposal. GARTNER,
Miss Saigor~Coalition: Organizing Across Race and Sexuality, in THE STATEOF ASIAN
AMERICA:ACTIVIS~I
AND RESISTANCE
IN THE 1990s 275 (Karin Aguillar-San Juan ed.,
1994) (describing clash between gay and straight Asian American activists and Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund).
lo6Foran especially rich source of lesbian and gay history in New York, see GEORGE
CHAUNCEY,
GAYNEW YORK(1994).
lo7 See, e.g., Terry Golway. N a d l e ~Duane in "Heartbreak" Race for Affections of West
Side Liberals, N.Y. OBSERVER,
May 30, 1994, at 1 (describing West Side Democrats as
"famed for sending the very purest of pure liberals to Capitol Hill").
lo8See,e.g., Hernandez, supra note 84.
lo9See Norimitsu Onishi, In a Gay Haven, a Sense of Community Builds, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1994, 9 13, at 9.
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While nonelectoral information served merely as supporting evidence of
the concentration of lesbians and gay men in Manhattan, it was the
primary evidence relied on by activists in Brooklyn, who lacked the
electoral records available to Manhattan advocates.l1° Further, the proposed lesbian and gay district cut through several incumbent strongholds
and minority cornm~nities."~As a result, the Commission completely
ignored the Brooklyn proposal and split Park Slope into three districts.l12
The Commission eliminated the opportunity for lesbians and gay men
from this area to elect a representative of their choice by fracturing their
voting strength among several districts.
Many lesbians and gay men focused on the apparent end of their
electoral exile and lauded the Commission's work, despite the fact that
only one district out of fifty-one was designed to elect a candidate supporting lesbian and gay interests. Pleased with the possibility that they
would gain some representation, many lesbians and gay men ignored their
unrealized potential. However, Outweek-then the largest circulation magazine for lesbian and gay readers in New York-criticized the Commission's efforts.l13 Another response to the plan noted that no one on the
Commission was lesbian or gay and commented that the Commission's
composition hurt the general lesbian and gay effort.lI4
The limitations of the redistricting process in New York City reveal
the myriad problems that a districting system poses for the representation
of lesbian and gay interests. The undemocratic, top-down representation
fixed by the fifteen-member Commission, the distorting population determinations required by that Commission, and the ultimate disappointment
of Brooklyn's lesbian and gay voters exposes the failures of districting
for lesbian and gay communities in their search for representation.

"Osee Kysella, supra note 28, at 255-56; see also Testimony by George Waffle before
the New York City Districting Commission (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with author).
ll1Testimony by George Waffle before the Districting Commission (May 7, 1991) (on
file with author). The fact that lesbians and gay men could not assert themselves in
Brooklyn, where more blacks and Latinos lived, demonstrates lesbian and gay interest
subordination to ethnic and racial minority interests.
l12The division of Park Slope was intended, in part, to create a Latino district.
However, Brooklyn's 20% Latino population was so dispersed that it only received one
safe district out of 17. Brooklyn's Latinos, like Latinos citywide, are far less concentrated
than African Americans in New York City. See Jack Newfield, Hidden Agendas Ruled,
Council Gerrymandered, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1991, at 10.
l13The Case of the Missing Districts, OUTWEEK,May 1, 1991, at 4 (arguing that since
lesbians and gay men constituted 10% of New York's population, they deserved at least
five seats on the City Council).
l14See, e.g., Testimony by George Waffle before the New York City Districting
Commission (May 29, 1991) (on file with author).
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III. Empowerment of Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional
Representation
A. An Overview of Proportional Representation
From 1937 to 1945, New York's City Council was elected proportionally by borough. Called by some the "Golden Age of the City Council,"l15 the diversity of political affiliation, from Communists to Republicans, fostered vigorous debate among the elected representatives.l16 By
permitting people to unify around their interests rather than being divided
by location, a proportional system could rekindle the kind of broad debate
that once flourished and include lesbian and gay interests in that debate.
In proportional representation systems, seats are apportioned to candidates or parties in relation to the votes that the candidates or parties
receive. Voters collectively elect several representatives on a jurisdictionwide basis.l17 Since the winning candidates need only meet a threshold of
votes to be elected-the size of which varies in inverse proportion to the
number of representatives in a jurisdiction-a voter has more candidates
from which to choose and is far more likely to actually elect a candidate
with her vote.l18 Unlike in single-member districts, where the voters in
one specific area elect one representative, voters in proportional systems
can unite exclusively around interest^."^ With fewer geographic divisions,
voters can choose how to form their constituencies within a jurisdicti~n.'~~
"SMartin Gottlieb, The 'Golden Age'of the City Council, N.Y. TIMES,June 11, 1991,
§ 4, at 6.

116Id. While the last proportional election in 1945 led to the Council's 65% Democratic majority, the composition of the Council was skewed even more heavily in favor of
Democrats in 1949-two years after the system was voted out by referendum. At that time,
Democrats won 24 of the Council's 25 seats. Id.
"'The fact that proportional representation is not a majority rule system distinguishes
it from multimember, at-large districting-another jurisdiction-wide system. In a multimember, at-large jurisdiction, a group of representatives is elected by a majority of voters
jurisdiction-wide. As in proportional representation, each voter in the jurisdiction votes for
all of the seats. However, because multimember at-large contests are won by simple
majorities, even significant minorities can be subjugated, unlike under proportional representation. Guinier, No nvo Seats, supra note 16, at 1461-64.
11sSee Inman, supra note 28, at 2004. The threshold for election-that is, the
minimum percentage of votes that a candidate must receive in order to win--differs
depending on the proportional system and the number of seats, candidates, and voters. The
crucial variable in all proportional systems is the number of seats: the higher the number
of seats, the lower the threshold for election. Id. at 2001 n.38 ('With one vote for each
voter in a nine-member district, for example, any candidate who receives at least one vote
more than one-tenth of the votes cast is sure of election.").
"')Even under proportional representation, some single-member jurisdictions would
exist. For example, the six states that currently elect only one representative to the House
of Representatives would remain single-member districts under a proportional system. See
Inman, supra note 28, at 2005 n.60.
120Largejurisdictions would need to be subdivided to make elections manageable. See
id. at 2005 n.59. California, for example, might be divided into three divisions, each
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A representative is therefore bound by her constituency's beliefs rather
than by its location.
One distinct advantage of proportional representation over districting
is that the sharp increase in voting power for all individuals weakens
majority rule and empowers minorities. In a direct election for a single
candidate, the majority of votes may be wasted-that is, they may not
lead to the election of a candidate-if several candidates split the vote.121
Under a proportional system, if there are ten seats up for election, the
threshold for election is the percentage of votes attained by the candidate
who ranks tenth. Because the threshold for election is far smaller than
that under majority rule, there are fewer wasted votes. Proportional representation translates a far greater number of votes into the election of a
candidate.
Proportional representation also empowers minority communities to
a greater extent than a districting system. Under districting, the support
of a majority or even a plurality of voters suffices for complete victory.
For example, if each of Texas's representatives in Congress were elected
by slight majorities of 51%, a full 49% of voting Texans would constitute
an unrepresented minority in a districting system. In a proportional system, however, the election would take place in multimember districts or
statewide, with a far smaller population excluded from powersharing.
Although a proportional system preserves the ability of a group that
constitutes a majority to exercise its power, that majority does not succeed
to the exclusion of minorities.

B. Forms of Proportional Representation
There are several types of proportional representation, the most significant of which are the single transferable vote ("STV"), list proportional representation, and cumulative voting.122Under the STY the system
currently used in the New York City School Board elections, each voter
electing 17 representatives to the U.S. House of Representatives. Such a system would
still permit far broader representation than districting because the threshold for election
would be under six percent of the vote.
121This situation occurred in the 1992 presidentid election, when approximately 57%
of the voters did not vote for the winning candidate. See Robin Toner, Clinton Captures
Presidency with Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress, N.Y. T m r ~ s ,Nov.
4, 1992, at A1 (stating that Bill Clinton gamered 43% of the vote; George Bush, 38%;
and Ross Perot, 18%).
122Because other scholarship thoroughly describes these different systems, this Article
will not explore differences in any great detail. See, e.g., Edward Still, Alternatives to
VOTEDILUTION,
supra note 68, at 249 (summarizSingle-Member Districts, in MINORITY
ing a broad range of voting systems that might substitute for a single-member district
system). For a description of cumulative voting, see Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra
note 59, at 1632-33 (advocating cumulative voting). See also Inman, supra note 28, at
1999-2002 (describing STV); John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Pro-
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ranks a list of candidates by preference. If a voter's first choice candidate
has already received enough votes to win a seat, her vote is transferred
to her second choice, or the following choice, until all seats are filled.
This system wastes the fewest votes.123Because each voter chooses several candidates, the likelihood that a voter's vote will propel a candidate
to victory is higher. However, the high number of candidates and the
complexity of choice and vote calculation in an STV election can make
the system highly ~ 0 n f u s i n g . l ~ ~
The second type of proportional representation is list proportional
representation. Under this system, which is commonly used in Europe, a
party receives a number of seats relative to the percentage of votes received by the party.125The party in turn determines who will serve in the
government. The principal drawback to this system is exemplified by its
use in Italy, where shifting coalitions based on party loyalty have led to
A second, often noted, disadvantage of
regular government c01lapses.l~~
this system is that it transfers power from the voter to the party, which
can lead to the existence of a strengthened elite.
Under the third proportional representation system-cumulative votFor
ing--each voter receives one vote for each seat up for e1ecti0n.l~~
example, in a state with five congressional seats, each resident would have
five votes to divide among the candidates seeking the seats.12*Some voters
might vote several times for one candidate, emphasizing their preference
and permitting an underrepresented or unrepresented community to attain

portior~alRepresentation, 94 YALEL.J. 163, 186 n.107 (1984) (discussing list proportional
representation).
Iz3See Inman, supra note 28, at 2048; Alexander A. Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right
to Vote ~vitlithe Voting Rights Act, 92 COLUM.L. REV. 1810, 1864-65 (1992).
lZ4STVproportional representation is accused of fostering confusion because the voter
does not know which of her votes will actually count. During the 1993 School Board
elections in New York City, many remarked upon the complexity of the system. See
Interview with Thomas K. Duane, New York City Council Member, in New York, N.Y.
(Dec. 31, 1993).
Iz5See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U . PA.
L. REV.801. 846-47 11.151 (1993) (comparing the German, Israeli, and Italian proportional
systems); Flora Lewis, Europe Sl~opsfor a Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES,June 29, 1991, 9 1, at
23 (describing the party-list system in Europe).
126AlanCowell. Italians Vote: Can Thev Start a Political Revival?, N.Y. TIMES,
- AD^.
19, 1993, at AS.
'27Cumulative voting is commonly used for corporate board elections. ROBERTC.
CLARK,CORPORATE
LAW361-66 (1986) (explaining the use and mechanics of cumulative
voting in corporate elections).
128Theminimum number of votes needed to win a seat can be calculated using the
1, where N is the minimum number of necessary votes, V
formula N = [V I (R+l)]
is the number of voters, and R is the number of available slots. See Guinier, Emperor's
Clothes, supra note 59, at 1633 n.170. In states with large congressional delegations,
smaller divisions might be created to simplify voters' Choices. Although such multimember
jurisdictions do insert some geographical interests into proportional systems, the influence
of geography is weaker than in a single-member districting system.

+
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representation. Cumulative voting thus provides for greater minority empowerment in comparison with other proportional systems by permitting
even smaller minority groups to achieve representation through vote concentration. Under this system, lesbian and gay voters could elect larger
numbers of representatives by concentrating their votes.
Although each of the above proportional representation systems addresses the key flaws of districting-that it is geographically based and
majority-ruled-cumulative voting would be the most effective of the
three systems in improving lesbian and gay interest representation. First,
a voter in a cumulative system has the opportunity to vote for several
candidates and can therefore give voice to her full range of political
interests. This aspect of the system may improve minority interest representation, including that of lesbians and gay men, by permitting those
with strong ties to a particular cause to vote several times for one candidate. Second, as it permits all voters to voice several political interests,
cumulative voting would allow for the expression of lesbian and gay
intersectionality. If an African American lesbian wanted to vote for an
African American candidate as well as for a lesbian candidate, she could
do so. .Third, under districting and noncumulative proportional systems,
lesbians and gay men who are politically committed to other issues might
not vote for a lesbian or gay candidate, whereas a cumulative system
would permit a marginally lesbian- or gay-identified person to exhibit
some support for lesbian and gay interests. Expression of the full range
of lesbian and gay identities would r e ~ u 1 t . l ~ ~

C. Effective Representation of Lesbian and Gay Interests Under
Proportional Systems

Proportional representation would dejnitely consolidate our voting strength and be more representative of our true
Given the lesbian and gay representational characteristics already
discussed,131lesbians and gay men would benefit from a proportional
system. First, proportional representation does not require that a group be
officially identifiable. Political positions rather than places of residence
As a result, lesbian and gay voters jurisdicdetermine repre~entati0n.l~~
tion-wide could vote for those candidates most suited to their needs;
lZ9Onemight argue that an STV system, in which voters rank candidates by preference, would equally permit such intersectional voting. However, only one of the ranked
candidates under such a system ultimately receives the voter's vote.
1301nte~iew
with Richard Dadey, supra note 9.
l3l See supra part I.B.
132See,e.g., Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1634.
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identification and demographic difficulties would not impede effective
interest representation.
Lesbians and gay men with intersectional identities would be especially well-represented under a proportional representation system. Poor
lesbians and gay men would not be excluded from representation merely
because they could not afford to live in expensive gay neighborhoods.
Also, the more dispersed residential patterns of lesbians would not undercut the effective representation of lesbian interests. Proportional representation, by emphasizing the power of the vote over that of geography,
would directly provide all lesbians and gay men with an incentive to
engage in electoral politics.
For those lesbian and gay communities located outside of urban
centers, proportional representation is the only effective way to represent
the interests of their members. Under a districting system, such interests
are not represented since their members are too dispersed to constitute a
majority or even an influence district. Under proportional representation,
however, even members of suburban lesbian and gay communities might
attain interest representation. For example, if Florida adopted proportional
representation for its congressional delegation, members of lesbian and
gay communities from Key West, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale could unite
to attain interest representation as part of that delegation.
Moreover, lesbians and gay men who exhibit a higher-than-average
registration rate and voter turnout in their jurisdictions would be rewarded
under a proportional representation system.133In such a system, voter
turnout is the most relevant factor in a candidate's election. The 1993 New
York City School Board elections, in which a proportional system enabled
candidates representing lesbian and gay interests to achieve an overwhelming victory,13j illustrate the power of the lesbian and gay community to
vote when threatened.135
133Statistics from the early 1980s indicate that while 17% of San Francisco's population is lesbian and gay, "[b]ecause of their age, level of education, and militancy, gays
represent about 25% of registered voters, and in decisive elections, their high turnout may
supra note 40, at 138. The opposite phenomenon
approach 30% of the voters:' CASTELLS,
afflicts communities of color, where 65% is often used as the minimum population
necessary to constitute a majority-minority district because of low voter participation. See
Ketchum v. Byme, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the 65% rule
results from the addition of 5% for lower registration, 5% for lower turnout at the polls,
and 5% for the relative youth of the minority population to a simple 50% majority). Voting
rights literature often addresses this 'rule.'' See, e.g., K i b a l l Brace et al., Minorify Voting
Equality: The 65% Rule in Theory and Practice, 10 LAW& POL'Y 43 (1988); Frank R.
Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITYVOTE
DILUTION,supra note 68, at 108-11. Without "hard data," it would be difficult to
determine the electoral strength of lesbians and gay men of color.
134See supra pp. 1 4 , see also Sam Dillon, Nav York Cify's 32 School Boards Get
New Faces but Not New Views, N.Y. TIMES,May 22, 1993, at Al. The Board of Elections
uses the single transferable vote. See Gottlieb, supra note 115.
135Sam Dillon, "Light" School Board Vote Was Really the Heaviest Ever, N.Y. TIMES,
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Under a proportional system, the number of lesbian and gay representatives would still be small compared to that of heterosexual representatives. Furthermore, representatives would still face problems such as
those confronting black and Latino legislators, whose voices have been
weakened by procedural sleights of hand.136Nevertheless, proportional
voting would advance lesbian and gay interest representation. Increased
numbers and greater possibilities for coalition building would motivate
other representatives to deal with lesbian and gay colleagues and interests
on a daiiy basis.137
Perhaps most important, the symbolic value of lesbian and gay interest representation would provide lesbian and gay communities with political self-respect. Included in the political process, lesbians and gay men
would feel less alienated and would express their interests within the
system rather than through more radical means. Lesbian and gay electoral
success under a proportional system might encourage other minorities to
participate in the political process, especially under a cumulative voting
system.
Under proportional representation, campaigns would face challenging
transformations because they would be more geographically extensive
than under districting. Broader coalition building among lesbian and gay
communities would be necessary in order to win jurisdiction-wide elections. Well-heeled lesbian and gay urban communities might help fund
candidates who could be elected with suburban as well as urban votes.
The challenges to lesbian and gay political strategists would be great
because they would have to determine both how to organize diverse
communities to get out votes and how to conduct a jurisdiction-wide
media campaign.138But even in a state like Horida, where lesbian and gay
communities are less organized than those in New York and California,
such a campaign might well succeed. Access to representation for lesbians
and gay men from suburban and rural areas might increase their participation ia the political process, bring them toward the center of lesbian
and gay politics, and even motivate them to organize their own campaign~.'~~
May 19, 1993, at A1 (quoting Jon Nalley) ("The gay community felt very threatened by
the Catholic Church's alliance with the Pat Robertson types, and gays felt really called
upon to go to the polls."). In response to this call, total votes in the West Village-Chelsea
district quadrupled. Id.
136Seegenerally Guinier, Single-Member Districts, supra note 31, at 1152-53 (discussing third-generation voting rights cases, which center on discrimination against
minority representatives designed to prevent them from significantly affecting legislatures).
137GeorgeWaffle, Address to the Districting Commission (May 7, 1991) (on file with
author).
138Strategistsalready balance the complexities of running for office as a lesbian or
gay candidate. See generally GAYAND LESBIANVICTORYFUND,supra note 4.
139Forfront-line perspectives on running for office as an openly lesbian or gay

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 145 1996

146

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 31

D. Arguments Against Proportional Representation
Several objections are often raised in response to suggestions to
implement proportional representation. First, proportional representation
is often criticized for ignoring local interests.140 However, under proportional representation, voters would still be able to organize and elect
representatives based on local interest~'~+eography would be one among
many possible proxies for interest. Defining the representative's constituency by interest would thus maintain activism around local issues.
Critics also argue that proportional representation would deprive the
To the
representative of the ability to consult a concrete constit~ency.'~~
contrary, a representative would have a clearer political position because
her supporters would be politically unified.143The legislator would be
liberated from constant polling to determine which position appeals to the
most voters. Rather, she would be compelled to vote consistently for
positions taken during her campaign. In this respect, proportional representation would lead to fuller debates on all issues between legislators
with unified political constituencies.
Another major criticism of proportional representation is that, by
preventing simple majorities from ruling, it would subvert fundamental
democratic principles. However, the government's legitimacy derives not
simply from the consent of the majority but from that of all people. In
addition, the lower percentage of wasted votes would make proportional
candidate outside of lesbian and gay population centers, see Dale McCormick, Running in
a Rural District, in GAYAND LESBIANVICTORYFUND,supra note 4, at 223 and Irene
Rabinowitz, Rurinirig in a Small Town, in GAYAND LESBIANVICTORYFUND,supra note
4, at 219.
I4OAlan Gartner, the executive director of the New York City Districting Commission,
has stated:
If there's any validity to geographic representation, it is in local government. I
would be more interested in thinking about proportional representation for other
than local government, federal or maybe state government. The kinds of issues
that a congressmember deals with have really very little to do with basic
geographic proximity . . . . [Gliven the size of districts except in minority areas,
they cover such a diversity, that it's difficult to say that there's one interest.
Interview with Alan Gartner, supra note 104; see also Peter H . Schuck, The Thickest
Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM.L. REV.
1325, 1371-72 (1987). But see Inman, supra note 28, at 2016-18 (summarizing and
countering geographic and local interest criticisms of proportional representation).
14lSee Guinier, No T,vo Seats, supra note 16, at 1473 ("[Ilnterest representation
generates incentives for community-based organizations to play a more active role in
mobilizing the electorate and monitoring the legislature by both protecting and ratifying
authentic representatives.").
142Id. (countering the arguments of opponents of proportional representation).
143See Guinier, Emperor's Clothes, supra note 59, at 1638 (arguing that proportional
representation "restores the link between representation and voting by ensuring that
legislators represent unanimous, not divided, constituencies").
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representation an especially effective system for representative democracy.
Proportional representation would also enhance democracy because
each vote in a jurisdiction would have equal weight. Although the Supreme Court has clearly required almost exact population equality among
districts, vast inequalities in voting participation rates among districts
significantly weaken the effectiveness of this requirement. For example,
if District A has a 40% voting rate and District B has an 80% voting rate,
the voters in District A have votes that are iwice as powerfd 8s those In
District B-because fewer votes are required to win an election. Districts
with lower participation rates receive as much representation as districts
with high rates, leading to the same inequality that propelled the Supreme
Court to reject Alabama's apportionment scheme in Reynolds v. S i r n ~ . ' ~ ~
Under a proportional system, on the other hand, representation would
depend on actual votes rather than on district lines that dilute some votes
and fortify others.145Proportional representation would express democratic ideals by allowing an individual's level of interest to determine her
own role in the political process.
Many critics contend that proportional representation would create
instability by emphasizing minority interests.146 Others assert that the
two-party system, the bulwark of majority rule, is necessary for stability.147However, the current districting system itself encourages instability.
The top-down organization of representation along racial and ethnic lines,
required by the Voting Rights Act, has drawn fire for "balkanizing" legi s l a t u r e ~ Furthermore,
.~~~
districting divides many communities by drawing lines around and through them. The stability of majority rule is thus
a false one based on the loss of voting power of a significant part of the
e1e~torate.l~~
Proportional representation, by contrast, would embrace the
opinions of a far broader population of voters. The incorporation of such
diverse perspectives would increase voter participation, which would in
turn discourage extrasystemic political actions such as terrorism and riot144377U.S. 533 (1964). The Court objected to the fact that districts varied in
population, thus weighting the votes of some citizens over others. In a proportional system,
the only inequity in the value of a vote occurs when a candidate has won by slightly
passing the threshold, and the votes she received are more important to her than those
received by a candidate who easily passed the threshold. However, such inequity exists in
any election system.
1451d.at 535.
146See, e-g., Inman, supra note 28, at 2020-21 (countering the arguments of a wide
range of opponents of proportional representation); see also Peter J . Taylor, The Case for
AN ELECProportional Tenure: A Defense of the British Electoral System, in CHOOSING
TORAL SYSTEM
53, 57 (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
147See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148SeeBalkanizing the City Council, N.Y. POST,June 7, 1991, at 34.
149See ROBERTG. DIXON,JR., DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT
IN
LAWAND POLITICS49 (1968).
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ing. Thus, proportional representation would encourage stability without
undermining local interests.
IV. The Legal and Political Challenges of Implementing a Proportional
System
However clear it may be that proportional representation would greatly
improve lesbian and gay interest representation-as well as that of all
voters-such a change cannot be enacted without first overcoming legal
and political obstacles.

A. Tlze Questionable Legal Status of Proportional Representation
Those arguing for the institution of proportional representation face
the ambivalence of the current law toward proportional remedies. The
Voting Rights Act neither mandates nor prohibits such remedies.150 Nonetheless, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act as well as subsequent Supreme Court cases indicate that
proportional systems are disfavored.lS1Furthermore, even certain liberal
Supreme Court Justices have conceded that an interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act that required proportional representation would turn the Court
into a super-legislature.lS2
Voting rights scholars, however, argue that the Court could interpret
case law and statutes to require a remedy that institutes proportional
representation.lS3Guinier has asserted that the requirements of sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act would be most effectively met by a system
of proportional representation that allowed minority communities to have
Inman argues further that because the Sutheir interests repre~ented.'~~
'SO42 U.S.C. 5 1973(b) ("[Nlothing . . . establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.").
'SlThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36 (1986) (recognizing that the Voting Rights
Act does not provide for proportional remedies); S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
94 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 364 (additional views of Senator Robert
Dole) ("It was generally agreed that the concept of certain identifiable groups having a
right to be elected in proportion to their voting potential was repugnant to the democratic
principles upon which our society is based:').
ISzSee, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 123 (Marshall, I., dissenting)
(acknowledging the majority's criticism of a proportional representation requirement).
153111 fact, at least one court has ordered a jurisdiction to adopt a proportional
representation system as a remedy to a Voting Rights Act violation. See Cane v. Worcester
County, 847 F. Supp. 369 (Md. 1994). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 921 (3d Cir.
1994) (remanding for consideration of county-proffered remedy).
154See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1493-1513. Indeed, in Holder v. Hall,
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that nothing in the Voting Rights Act
affirmatively prohibits courts from instituting proportional representation systems as
remedies to Voting Rights Act violations. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2601 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concumng) (characterizing districting systems as "merely political choices"
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preme Court has recognized that representation based on group identity
already serves as a baseline for fair districtinglS5-despite the cautionary
language of the Voting Rights Act-proportional representation is a better
This recognition of group
solution for voting rights discri~nination.~~~
remedies for voting rights discrimination within the Court's jurisprudence
suggests that proportional representation could obtain judicial approval.

B. The Inability of Lesbian and Gay Communities to Institute
Proportional Representation Single-Handedly
The unprecedented leap by lesbians and gay men onto the American
political stage has been accompanied by heterosexist reactionary forces
that impede lesbian and gay progress. The inclusion of lesbian and gay
interests in the Clinton campaign, the attempted reversal of the ban on
lesbians and gay men in the military, and the appointment of an openly
lesbian politician to an upper-level cabinet position demonstrate a heretofore unseen prominence of lesbian and gay interests.lS7Although widespread Republican victories in the 1994 congressional elections foreshadow continued congressional homophobia,1ss two antigay initiatives
were defeated, and twenty-four lesbian or gay officials reelected or newly
l~~
as lesbian and gay community organizelected to 0 f f i ~ e . Nevertheless,
ing has grown, so have antigay forces.160 Where rights have been won by
lesbian and gay men, referenda sponsored by the Christian Right have
~ ~this climate, it seems highly
succeeded in limiting such ~ i c t 0 r i e s . lh
unlikely that the nation-or any state or locality for that matter-would
that "may fall under suspicion of havrng a dilutive effect on minority voting strength" in
violation of the Voting Rights Act).
155Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) ("[Nleither we nor the district
courts have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable
population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength
of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of
proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State.").
156Seegenerally Inman, supra note 28.
157See Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Confirm Achtenberg; Californian Will Take HUD
Post as First Openly Lesbian Ojjicial, WASH.POST, May 25, 1993, at A7.
lS8See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Gingrich Criticized for Opposing Job Protection for Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 8, 1995, at A19. But see Frank Rich, Closet Clout, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1995, at A23 (arguing that because it is unlikely that the Christian Right will vote
for Democrats, the GOP should woo lesbian and gay swing.voters).
lS9David W. Dunlap, Gay Politicians Cite Gains Amid Losses, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 14,
1994, at B9 (quoting Sheila James Kuehl, newly elected California state representative).
160See Jeffrey Schmalz, Homosexuals Wake to See a Referendum: It's on Them, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 31, 1993, 8 4, at 1.
'6'In the wake of the passage of CoIorado's referendum Amendment 2, which would
prohibit the extension of civil rights protections to lesbians and gay men, many states and
localities have already approved or will soon vote on similar antigay referenda. For the
perspective of two openly gay and lesbian elected officials on opposing the Christian
Right, see Glen Maxey, Running Against the Right, in GAYAND LESBIANVICTORYFUND,
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reform its electoral system for the express purpose of improving lesbian
and gay interest representation. Attaining proportional representation will
require a far broader political movement, one that includes other minority
groups as well as the general electorate.

V. Realizing Proportional Representation
A. The Miller (D)evolutioiz: Erasing Minority Electoral Empowerment
The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Johnson162has profoundly transformed the law of districting. The Court based its holding
on Shaw v. Reno,163in which it found that a majority-African American
Adopting the
district in North Carolina "stigmatized" white pe0p1e.l~~
SItaw Court's holding, the Miller Court held that "a plaintiff states a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a state redistricting
plan, on its face, has no rational explanation save as an effort to separate
voters on the basis of race."165In Miller, the Court held that a Georgia
congressional district created predominantly to empower African Americans was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.166
With the establishment of a Shaw claim, the Court may have spawned
a new generation of voting rights litigation unlike that of the previous
three generation^.'^^ As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Miller,
"[tlhe Court attempts an explanation in these cases by equating the injury
it imagines respondents have suffered with the injuries African Americans
supra note 4, at 159; Gail Shibley, Corning Out on Every Doorstep, in GAYAND LESBIAN
VICTORY
FUND,supra note 4, at 91.
16* 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
163 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
'"Id. at 2818. 2824.
16sMiller. 115 S. Ct. at 2475.
166Id. The principal evidence for the majority was that race served as the only common
characteristic among the residents of this not-so-irregular district. This lack of significant
irregularity is noted by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. See id. at 2502-03 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
167The term "generation" merely denotes the establishment of a new kind of voting
rights litigation; it does not indicate progress. The first generation of voting rights
litigation concerned the attempt to attain the right to vote for all African Americans. See,
e.g., Terry v. Adams. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that a Democratic primary that
functioned as an election and excluded African Americans violated the Equal Protection
Clause). The second generation focused on the right to representation in legislatures. See,
e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that a North Carolina districting
scheme violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). The third generation involved efforts
to oppose legislative rule changes that were designed to prevent minority elected officials
from affecting public policy. See, e.g., Rojas v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., No. V-87-16,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11049 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989)
(holding that a school board's action did not violate the Voting Rights Act when, after a
Mexican American woman was elected, the board changed its rules to require the support
of two members to put an issue before the board).
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In this fourth generation of voting rights
suffered under segregati~n."'~~
litigation, the goal, rather than preventing new forms of discrimination
against minorities, would be to prevent "reverse discrimination" against
whites in majority-African American districts. The harm against whites
suggested by Shaw has developed into an equal protection claim before
the Court, opening the door for all white residents in majority-minority
districts to sue.169If the district's formation has been primarily based on
race, white residents would likely win, forcing districting bodies across
the muntry to weaken African Americar, repeseotatim.
Justice Ginsburg's dissent reveals the potentially ironic results of the
Miller decision:
If Chinese Americans and Russian Americans may seek and
secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts,
then African Americans should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in the name of equal protection, we would shut out "the
very minority group whose history in the United States gave
birth to the Equal Protection
Had Justice Ginsburg added lesbians and gay men to the list of groups
permitted to influence districting, she would have described a possible
reversal of the power balance between the lesbian and gay communities
and the African American communities during the New York redistricting
process. Miller restricts the use of race in the redistricting process; the
decision does not restrict the use of sexual orientation in drawing district
lines.17'

B. The Potential of Minority Coalition Building
Coalitions between lesbians and gay men and other minorities, who
could benefit from the conversion to a proportional system in the wake
of Miller, could serve as an effective path toward realizing proportional
168MiIler,115 S. Ct. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
l'j91ndeed, many such suits are already happening. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Suits
Challenging Redrawn Districts That Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 14, 1994, at A1
(discussing the wave of suits challenging majority-minority districts since Shaw v. Reno).
The changes in this domain of the law are only beginning, as the Supreme Court seems
poised to further consider the voting rights issues raised in Shaw v. Reno. See Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Plan to Delve Anew lnto Race and Voting
N.Y. TIMES,July
-Rights,
.
11, 1993, $ 1, at 1.
l7OMiller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113
S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
I7l For a further elaboration of the effect of Miller on racial and sexual minorities, see
Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas": Lesbian and Gay Districts and Black Electoral Empowerment, 39 How.L.J. (forthcoming, 1996).
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representation.17*The Miller case and its interpretation of Shaw v. Reno
are raising consciousness among African Americans and other minorities,
who are now barely protected in a districting system by Voting Rights Act
remedies. The ruling, which was handed down shortly after the 1994
Republican congressional victories, has led to further dissatisfaction with
~~
opposition to the
electoral politics among African A m e r i c a n ~ . 'Rising
race-conscious districting that created the district overturned in Shaw v.
Reno might propel civil rights activists to support broader electoral changes
that would encourage minority interest representation. Confronting problems similar to those plaguing lesbians and gay men-packing and fracturing, virtual representation, tokenism, and an array of other electoral
disempowerment phenomena-such minorities may conclude that districting itself is not ultimately in their interests.174Prominent African Americans have questioned the value of race-conscious districting for the advancement of African American interests.'75 Dissatisfaction among f i c a n
Americans only increased with widespread Democratic party losses in the
1994 congressional elections176and might well lead to a reconsideration
of electoral structures.177The new political realities indicate a profound
exclusion of African Americans from the political system. Without hope

172Huey P. Newton, the minister of defense for the Black Panther Party, described the
beginning of such a coalition. See Huey P. Newton, A Letter from Huey E? Newton, COME
OUT!, Sept.-Oct. 1970, at 12 (reprinting an internal letter from Huey P. Newton to the
other brothers of the Black Panther Party). For a discussion of lesbian and gay participation in minority movements, see MARTIN DUBERMAN,
STONEWALL
(1993) and JOHN
D'EMILIO,SEXUAL
POLITICS,SEXUALCOMMUNITIES
(1983).
173See Isabel Wlkerson, Many Blacks See Betrayal in This Year's Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES,NOV. 10, 1994, at B4. Some politicians and scholars argue that the creation of
minority districts divided African Americans from liberal whites, facilitating Republican
victories. See Steven A. Holmes, Did Racial Redistricting Undermine Democrats?, N.Y.
Dec. 13,
TIMES,NOV.13, 1994, 5 1, at 32; David Lublin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
1994, at A28.
174Indeed, as different minority communities grow and overlap geographically, they
will find less protection in the Voting Rights Act and perhaps become more supportive of
proportional representation alternatives. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerrrlenr: It's Not Just Black and White Any More, 47 STAN.L. REV. 957, 969-71, 975-77
(1995) (arguing that no remedy exists under the Voting Rights Act when concurrent
remedies for two different racial minority groups within a jurisdiction are mutually
exclusive and proposing cumulative voting as a solution).
175For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has criticized the enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act, declaring that "we have devised a remedial mechanism that encourages federal
courts to segregate voters into racially designated districts to ensure minority electoral
success!' Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Guinier,
Single-Member Districts, supra note 31, at 1163 ("Where blacks and whites are geographically separate, race-conscious districting by definition isolates blacks from potential white
allies such as white women who are not geographically concentrated.").
176See Wilkerson, supra note 173.
177"The sense of alienation has renewed the debate over alternatives to the two-party
system and the need [for blacks] to reach out to Hispanic, gay and other minority groups."
Id.
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for improvement of the status quo, African Americans might support such
"radical" changes as proportional representation.
The ability of lesbians and gay men to work with Asian Americans
and other minorities in the New York redistricting process proves instructive. This movement would certainly be furthered by a broader recognition
of the limitations placed on racial minority representation by white majorities within legislatures. Coalitions with racial, ethnic, and political
minorities can occur locally in progressive jurisdictions and thereby expand political debate.178For example, lesbian and gay poPitiml aceivists
might advocate for referenda or support litigation by protected minorities
under the Voting Rights Act.179The benefits of proportional remedies
would not only enhance minority interest representation but would also
expand such representation in all segments of the electorate.
C. Eliminating Voter Discontent

Profound voter discontent in recent years might also help overcome
popular skepticism about proportional representation. In both the 1992
and 1994 national elections, antigovernment discourse was a standard in
both major parties and among independents.lsO Heightened interest in
third-party or independent candidates reveals an electorate longing for
alternatives,lS1yet no force bolsters incumbency's inertia more than districting. Discouraged from uniting with others who agree with them,
voters instead demand pork-barrel favors from their representatives.
In a proportional system, all voters-not only lesbians and gay menwould be able to unite in dynamic ways. Proportional representation would
liberate the political system from strongholds of incumbency fortified by
each redistricting cycle. Tortured debate over third parties and independent
candidates would become irrelevant, as candidates and parties would flourish
to meet the demands of renewed voter activism.lS2Voters would unite
around many issues, shifting their allegiances to meet the demands of
178For example, Republicans in New York City might gain from proportional representation, given their current minority position. Cf. Calvin Sims, For Council Winner, A
Sign of Hope for Republicans, N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 7, 1991, at B7.
179See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1418 (suggesting that protected
minority groups' success in restructuring voting rules will have a salutary effect on the
political influence of other dispersed minorities).
lS0PeterApplebome, Ideas and Trends: How the Union Joined the South, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, $ 4, at 1.
181See Keith D. Eisner, Non-Major-Party Candidates and Televised Presidential
Debates: The Merits of Legislative Inclusion, 141 U . PA. L. REV. 973, 983 (1993)
(discussing the role of third parties as policy innovators and their function generally in a
two-party system); Bradley A. Smith, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third
Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV.
J . ON LEGIS.167, 169 (1991) (arguing that third parties
play a vital role in American politics and deserve ballot access).
lS2Inmanhas argued that "by allowing more expression of the diverse components of

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 153 1996

154

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 3 1

fresh political situations. A renaissance of democracy would result because many more individuals would vote for the elected candidates.
Conclusion
After Deborah Glick, a representative from the West Village, spoke
before the New York State Assembly in favor of a lesbian and gay civil
rights bill as "a Jew, a woman, and a lesbian," she received a standing
ovation from her fellow legislators.1g3The Assembly subsequently passed
the bill, supporting lesbian and gay rights legislation for the first time in
its history.lR4This victory, however, proved pyrrhic. Despite intensive
lobbying for the bill's passage, the bill died in the New York Senate.lg5
The Republican majority leadership refused to allow the bill to reach the
floor, preventing the pro-gay Republican minority from joining with the
Democratic minority for its passage.
The frustration of lesbian and gay interests under districting not only
heightens existing criticisms of the current system but also points toward
an alternative system where representation will come from decision making by individual voters rather than from line drawing by political elites.
In a proportional system, lesbians and gay men would form constituencies
that candidates would court. In order to gain the votes of these active
constituencies, representatives would advocate for the advancement of
lesbian and gay interests. Neither party would be able to control the
agenda or shut out vocal minorities completely. A broader range of interests would therefore be represented. Debate would flourish throughout the
nation's legislatures, giving advocates of lesbian and gay interests "a fair
chance to influence the political process."1g6

American society, a proportional representation system could lead to a significant renewal
of political life within . . . election contests." Inman, supra note 28, at 2007.
183Kevin Sack, Bill is Passed by Assembly on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 2, 1993,
at B1.
184 rd.
Is5See Kevin Sack, Republicans Kill Measure on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,July 3,
1993.. 6- 1.. at 21.
ls6Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986).

Heinonline - - 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 154 1996

